On January 16, 2018, Las Palmas was the setting for a high-level financial staging: the president of Redexis, the Canarian Fernando Bergasa, and the vice president of the European Investment Bank, Román Escolano, formalized a loan of 125 million euros in the presence of the Minister of Industry for the Government of the Canary Islands, Pedro Ortega, now president of CEOE based in Gran Canaria. Bergasa thought that in his homeland they wouldn’t do him harm. But they did. When the president of the Gran Canaria Cabildo opposed, the Canarian Government aligned and left Bergasa hanging, and Redexis vanished.
The array of figures was intoxicating: a total investment of 500 million, 2,900 kilometers of underground network, and the promise of creating 700 jobs to bring propane air to eight key municipalities. However, what was sold as the energy revolution of the archipelago ended up adding to the list of institutional disasters on the islands. The press representatives in Las Palmas were even replaced by others from Tenerife by a mysterious mandate.
The operations of Redexis in the Canary Islands are a textbook example of how a ‘investment-grade’ project with European backing fades when placed in the hands of local interlocutors more concerned with media shielding than with legal certainty. The plan, which aimed to reach 85% of the population and connect hundreds of hotels and hospitals, got trapped in the maze of authorizations and administrative hostility. While lobbyists sold access to the offices of the Ministry of Economy and Industry, the technical reality clashed with the lack of solid institutional support that went beyond the ceremonial photo opportunity.
This shipwreck shares the DNA of other failed projects in the Canary ports, where the figure of the shady intermediary acts as a filter that sullies foreign investment. Instead of paving the way, these actors—often embedded in business associations—manage the expectations of multinationals through PR whitening campaigns that have no real impact on the processing of the file. In the end, the 125 million from the EIB and the cash strength of Redexis were of no use against an ecosystem where subsidy dependency and the volatile commitment of local politicians are the norm.
Today, the 2,900-kilometer network is little more than a sketch on paper and a frustration for the 425,000 households that expected more competitive energy. The failure of Redexis shows that in the Canary Islands it is not enough to have the money and the technical plan; an institutional architecture is needed that is not hijacked by intermediaries who confuse lobbying with influence peddling, ultimately causing investors to lose their footing and capital absurdly.
