It is common sense as it involves a national security black hole. The port of Granadilla faces unprecedented administrative paralysis due to the allergy that wind turbines provoke in the military establishment. The main hurdle is technical and physical: the windmills that could be projected for the south of Tenerife would act as electromagnetic walls. Defense experts consulted by Canarymaritime warn that the movement of these structures generates radar clutter that incapacitates the Air Surveillance Squadron (EVA 22) from detecting low-altitude threats.
The security argument is not an excuse, it is a physical reality. The giant windmills projected would act as electromagnetic walls. At a time of maximum tension on the southern flank and the Sahel, allowing drones or unidentified aircraft to ‘hide’ behind the shadow of these giants is irresponsible. ‘Are we willing to lose our early detection capability for some megawatts that will increase infrastructure costs? NATO has already drawn the red line: the clarity of the Canary sky is not negotiable,’ states an expert from the defense services sector. Offshore wind threatens to turn a key port for Allies like Granadilla into a military exclusion zone. The paradox is that it would affect the arrival of American vessels and those from other NATO countries in an environment like the inter-island channel.
Furthermore, the low-frequency vibration of the turbines creates an ‘acoustic invisibility cloak’ on the seabed. This cancels out the hydrophones that detect foreign submarines in the Canary corridor. In addition, placing these structures over submarine fiber optic cables rolls out the red carpet for sabotage or international espionage disguised as ‘wind maintenance.’
And this does not account for the occupation of water space that limits the turning radius for deep-draft vessels, including rapid response naval units that require emergency docking. The location of Granadilla places the parks in the direct line of sight of civil and military air traffic control sensors, which would force Defense to issue a Declaration of Exclusion Zone, invalidating the profitability of the requested maritime plots. ‘A drone or an unidentified aircraft coming from the African continent could ‘hide’ in the shadow of relatively sized windmills and enter Canary airspace undetected,’ sources in the sector assert. In NATO, in a context of maximum tension on the southern flank and the Sahel, losing radar clarity in Tenerife is a red line they are not willing to cross.
Acoustic invisibility
But the risk is not only in the air because the low-frequency vibration that the foundations of the turbines (even if floatable) transmit to the seabed creates an ‘acoustic invisibility cloak’. This constant noise cancels out the hydrophones (passive sonars) that the Atlantic Alliance uses to monitor foreign submarine traffic through the strategic Canary corridor.
Granadilla is also a critical node for submarine fiber optic cables. Installing a wind farm above these ‘data arteries’ would facilitate, according to analysts, sabotage or underwater espionage operations that would be camouflaged by the industrial activity of the park.
The origin of the technology and control software for the turbines (often of non-EU manufacturing) is also a concern in Brussels. NATO will require ports handling critical energy to have military-grade protocols. The dilemma for Granadilla is clear: either it becomes a militarized bunker losing commercial agility, or it renounces the windmills to maintain its logistical operability.
The uncertainty over whether Defense will issue an unfavorable report will cause several financial developers to freeze their plans on the island. The military can order shutdowns at any time for national security reasons, states a risk consultant. There are technical solutions such as gap-fillers or stealth technology paint for the blades whose costs could escalate the project budget, making it unfeasible.
The viability of the project conflicts directly with Decree 584/1972 on Aeronautical Easements, which grants the Ministry of Defense the binding authority to veto any structure that degrades the radar signals of strategic units such as EVA 22. This technical limitation is compounded by compliance with the National Maritime Security Strategy (ESN 2023) and the new guidelines from NATO’s Critical Underwater Infrastructure Coordination Cell. Since Granadilla is a Port of General State Interest, its logistical operability and its role as a node for intercontinental data cables are legally subordinated to territorial defense. In this scenario, international regulations protecting allied communications prevail over administrative concessions, leaving wind developers in a legal limbo that is difficult to escape.
