Why is El Corte Inglés always empty in Santa Cruz de Tenerife and full in Las Palmas?
Because the civil servants in Tenerife’s capital come from rural areas. Those in Las Palmas city are from the Gran Canaria capital. And that pattern also carries over to pensioners’ votes. Playing with fire regarding staff and companies in the Port of Las Palmas could cause collateral damage in the ballot boxes in Las Palmas that is not perceived in Tenerife—and two people knew this well: Luis Ibarra (PSOE), former president of the Port of Las Palmas, and Betsabé Morales (CC), the manager until this summer of the Fundación Puertos de Las Palmas, which was left unprotected by the technical-political environment around Beatriz Calzada.
With less than a year until the 2027 election
With less than a year to the 2027 elections, the president of the Port of Las Palmas is sitting on an electoral powder keg amid union complaints about poor practices in labor relations involving her director, Francisco Trujillo. Trujillo entered the public sector with the PP in the SPEGC during the time of José Manuel Soria in the Cabildo of Gran Canaria (2003), and also with the ship agents’ employers’ association, the powerful and quiet Asocelpa, which Trujillo does not respond to, including letters demanding improved environmental coverage. After more than 100 years of activity, Asocelpa has seen many senior figures at the Port of Las Palmas—and those whom it has dismissed never manage to raise their heads again, either in the private sector or, even less, in the public sector.
A dense electoral fishing ground
The Port of La Luz y de Las Palmas concentrates an electoral fishing ground of enormous density in the Canary Islands. Its 136 concession companies directly employ 9,100 workers. In this tightly bounded environment, mechanisms of guild cohesion, managerial dependence, and union discipline activate currents of corporate voting with a decisive weight in the ballot boxes. 9,100 workers angered by congestion in Belén María, union complaints, or by being ignored by the employers’ side can generate an effect of 27,000 votes in the ballot boxes in 2027 in a direction entirely opposite to Calzada’s party, CC. Paying attention to naval repair operators who hire Filipinos, people from India, or trusting the right-wing stevedoring lobby has always meant heading straight for an electoral precipice. Stevedores usually vote for conservative options; they are well paid, with €8,800 net per month.
The case of Luis Ibarra
During Luis Ibarra’s two terms leading the Port Authority of Las Palmas (August 2011 to May 2018, and September 2019 to September 2023), the PSOE saw continued growth in its main electoral strongholds. In the City Council of Las Palmas, the Socialist Party’s list went from 33,211 votes (7 council seats) in the May 2015 elections to 48,480 ballots (11 councillors) in May 2019, consolidating victory in May 2023 with 50,512 supporters (12 seats).
In the Canary Islands Parliament, for the island constituency of Gran Canaria, results followed the same pattern: from the minimum of 3 seats in May 2015, it jumped to 5 MPs in May 2019 (102,398 votes), retaining the same representation in May 2023 after mobilizing 108,995 ballots. Likewise, in the May 2019 elections to the Cabildo of Gran Canaria, with Ibarra himself as the candidate for island president, the PSOE climbed to 90,133 votes and 8 councillors, confirming the electoral profitability generated by the social and industrial peace of the Port of La Luz for the Socialist Party’s siglas.
Household economic dependence transfers the worker’s political leaning to their immediate circle. A 2.5 to 3 voter average multiplier per family unit raises the labor mass at the docks into a potential block of 22,700 to 27,300 ballots. To this volume are added between 10,000 and 15,000 voters linked to indirect employment in the El Sebadal industrial estate and to auxiliary activities on the isthmus.
The port’s 27,000 family votes equate to the second most-voted political force in the City Council of Las Palmas de Gran Canaria. Its geographic concentration in the Isleta-Puerto-Guanarteme district defines the municipal outcome. The majorities in the capital’s full council—set at 15 councillors out of 29—depend on the margin of 4 to 5 councillors that this electorate mobilizes in response to demands related to licenses, industrial land, or urban planning investments. It has more electoral impact than municipal officials, certainly.
The Cabildo of Gran Canaria receives this impact through the single island tally. The 25,000 consolidated votes in the port area represent up to 3 councillors in a corporation of 29 seats. The orientation of this block shapes island governing pacts and determines the island’s presidency in scenarios of tight disputes between blocks. The Gran Canaria constituency for the Canary Islands Parliament assigns 15 seats at a historical cost of 18,000 to 22,000 votes per seat. The port block’s performance ensures one own regional deputy and contests a second in the distribution of remaining ballots. The slim difference that decides government majorities in the regional chamber grants this mass of voters the power to tip the presidency of the Canary Islands Government.
“The bloc vote in the Port of Las Palmas: 27,300 ballots that could decide the Canary Islands Government” was first published on canarymaritime.com.
