The geopolitics of oil has turned the waters around the Canary Islands into the setting for a movie-like manhunt. Washington has launched an unprecedented offensive against what it terms the mafia of Greek shipowners who, operating from the anonymity of Piraeus and using the waters of the archipelago as a logistical hub, facilitate the flow of sanctioned oil from Iran, Venezuela, and Russia. The recent wave of sanctions from the OFAC (Office of Foreign Assets Control) has identified the key players in this evasion network. The phantom fleet operating in the Greek financial circuit primarily uses the Central Atlantic for ship-to-ship transfers and maintenance, trying to remain unnoticed amid legitimate traffic around the islands.
At least a dozen oil tankers have been practicing spoofing (manipulation of AIS signals) off the Central Atlantic coasts. Vessels like the Quinn and the Garnet have been detected drifting or making U-turns near the routes that pass through the Canaries, unable to deliver their cargoes of naphtha or heavy crude. The seriousness of the situation lies in the fact that the Canaries have become, due to their location and services, a waiting or stopover space that is “necessary” in some cases for these shadowy vessels. The sanctioned Greek shipowners, such as Altomare or companies associated with Thasos Maritime, use the islands’ infrastructure to launder the origin of their routes. With the seizure of the Marinera (formerly Bella 1), Washington sends a clear message: neither the Russian flag nor the anonymity of shell companies in Piraeus guarantees impunity in the Central Atlantic.
The U.S. Department of the Treasury has directly pointed to the Greek company Altomare, based in Greece, for its connection to the transport of Iranian crude. The focus is on the supertanker Kallista, a VLCC registered under Panama, which U.S. evidence claims transported nearly 4 million barrels of Iranian oil in early 2025. Although managed by Altomare, the registered owner is Mercury Shipservices. The Treasury links this vessel with the network of Sepehr Energy Jahan Nama Pars Company, described as the sales arm for the oil of the Iranian Armed Forces General Staff.
The Venezuela Blockade: the Canaries as a Drift Zone
Another vessel linked to Altomare, the Niovi, made headlines in May 2023 when it was seized by Iran itself, underscoring the dangerous ambiguity of these maritime operators. At the same time, the U.S. has closed in on the network of Seyed Asadoollah Emamjomeh, an Iranian liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) magnate designated since April 2025. Four new gas carriers associated with his fleet have been blocked, adding to the six already previously sanctioned. Among the highlighted vessels in this complex machinery are: Gas Athena, Kaisa I, flagged under Panama and linked to Tilos Maritime and Trading, and Nexo, flagged under Gambia and associated with Serifos Maritime and Trading. The vessel Tusitala is also under the scrutiny of U.S. authorities.
The most dramatic case in recent days is that of the tanker Bella 1 (renamed as Marinera). This vessel, a sanctioned VLCC originally accused of financing the Houthis and Iran’s Quds Force, was involved in a transatlantic chase after refusing to be boarded by the U.S. Coast Guard in the Caribbean. To evade capture, the crew painted a Russian flag on the hull and the ship was hastily registered in Russia’s official registry (with a home port in Sochi). Despite this act of “sovereign protection,” the U.S. Coast Guard captured the vessel on January 7, 2026, near the Faroe Islands, ignoring Moscow’s diplomatic protests.
The U.S. ban on sanctioned oil tankers entering or leaving Venezuela has generated logistical chaos in the Atlantic. There are intercepted and seized ships such as the Skipper, with a false flag of Guyana (which has no international registry), declared stateless, intercepted, and taken to Galveston, Texas, to auction its cargo. The Centuries, flagged under Panama, was intercepted on December 20 after falsifying its location data to load in Venezuela.
News written by Gara H. Vega. Edited and verified by José L. Jiménez. Information cross-verified without institutional filters. This analysis has not been financed by official advertising nor conditioned by lobby interests.
