Security in the maritime space of the Western Atlantic faces a latent challenge marked by technological asymmetry and a lack of oversight of small-scale traffic. At the Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), Jay Benson, a senior researcher at Stable Seas, has outlined the findings of a report produced in collaboration with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Global Maritime Crime Programme. The analysis highlights how small, artisanal and unregulated vessels, such as pirogues and canoes, represent a blind spot for the trafficking of radiological and nuclear material in strategic regions such as West Africa—areas whose geographic proximity directly connects them to the strategic position of the Canary Islands.
A Vulnerability Map on the Maritime Border
The analysis begins by focusing on the fragility created by the proliferation of artisanal vessels for coastal security. Jay Benson warns that the risk inherent in this type of smuggling should be classified as a low-frequency threat with extraordinarily destructive consequences, stating that “the risk of radiological and nuclear trafficking by these types of boats could be classified as low probability, but with very serious consequences.” Based on historical records compiled by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), there are approximately 130 incidents a year involving material outside regulatory control worldwide, of which “a subset of less than 10% of those cases could probably be considered linked to trafficking activities.” However, the security gap widens when these operations leave the land and enter informal shipping networks.
The operational complexity in coastal areas stretching along Africa’s Atlantic seaboard lies in the complete integration of these vessels into the daily economic routines of coastal communities. Benson points out that “in many coastal areas from the Niger Delta and everywhere in between, these types of boats are central to many aspects of daily life, from fishing to local trade to passenger transport.” This omnipresence means that any illicit movement is concealed within the everyday flow. Added to this is the inability of traditional surveillance systems to detect such activity, since “in much of the world, there are fairly limited registration and monitoring regimes for these smaller vessels in particular, making it a significant challenge to track their activities at sea.”
Bypassing Formal Port Controls
While international investment in security has equipped major commercial terminals with radiation detection portals and advanced scanners, informal routes completely bypass this infrastructure. The Stable Seas researcher underscores this structural divergence, stating that “there has been significant progress in improving nuclear and radiological detection capabilities in much of the world, but much of this investment and attention has focused on large formal ports.” By contrast, unregulated fleets exploit the geography of open coastlines to land goods without state oversight, since “small, traditional and unregulated vessels, by their very nature, can evade these security points because they are not connected to modern port infrastructure.”
The report stresses that this problem does not operate in isolation, but overlaps with organized crime networks that already use the Atlantic to transport weapons, narcotics and illegally caught fish. In Benson’s view, effective prevention requires assessing multiple factors in combination, including “maritime law enforcement capacity and maritime domain awareness, the prevalence of existing maritime trafficking networks involving a range of illicit goods, the role of a region and the security surrounding nuclear and radiological material supply chains, the presence of non-state actors potentially seeking to acquire this type of material, monitoring and registration regimes, perceived levels of corruption in the maritime and port sectors, and socioeconomic conditions in coastal regions.”
Traceability and Tools to Protect the Atlantic
In response to the shortcomings of the Automatic Identification System (AIS)—whose minimum size requirements exclude most of the artisanal fleet and whose transmitters can be manipulated—the study proposes practical mitigation mechanisms. Among the experiences analyzed in the Atlantic, it highlights Ghana, where authorities implemented “a registration campaign for artisanal fishing canoes that includes the assignment of unique serial numbers and barcode identification cards for boat operators.” Likewise, in the South Atlantic, it cites Brazil’s model, as the country has taken measures to “improve monitoring of its fishing fleet by implementing a system requiring fishing vessels to use its monitoring system and share their location data through the Global Fishing Watch system.”
Alongside registration and passive technology, the report prioritizes the value of human intelligence at sea and the deployment of portable radiation detectors among maritime patrols. Benson argues that coastal communities possess “a very intimate knowledge of the normal pattern of life in their local waters” and know precisely “when a vessel is unfamiliar or is operating in a potentially suspicious manner.” Integrating this community information with individual inspection equipment turns every routine boarding into a passive containment barrier—a preventive framework of particular relevance to safeguarding the Canary Islands’ maritime border against the risk vectors crossing the central Atlantic.
The article The Risk of Invisible Nuclear Trafficking: The Illegal Fleet South of the Canary Islands and West African Shores was first published on canarymaritime.com.







